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A MEASURE OF RATIONALITY AND WELFARE
JOSE APESTEGUIAy AND MIGUEL A. BALLESTERz
Abstract. There is evidence showing that individual behavior often deviates from
the classical principle of maximization. This evidence raises at least two important
questions: (i) how severe the deviations are and (ii) which method is the best for
extracting relevant information from choice behavior for the purposes of welfare anal-
ysis. In this paper we address these two questions by identifying from a foundational
analysis a new measure of the rationality of individuals that enables the analysis of
individual welfare in potentially inconsistent subjects, all based on standard revealed
preference data. We call such measure minimal index.
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1. Introduction
The standard model of individual behavior is based in the maximization principle, in
which the alternative chosen by the individual is the one that maximizes a well-behaved
preference relation over the menu of available alternatives. The consensus concerning
this principle can be explained by at least two of its main features. The rst is that
it provides a simple and versatile account of individual behavior. It is dicult to
conceive of a simpler and more operational model with such a large predictive power.
Its second main feature is that it suggests the maximized preference relation as a tool
for individual welfare analysis. That is, the standard approach allows the policy-maker
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aiming to reproduce the decisions that, given the chance, the individual would have
made of her own volition.
Over the last decades, however, the research has produced increasing amounts of
evidence documenting systematic and predictable deviations from the notion of ratio-
nality implied in the maximization principle. Some phenomena that have attracted
a great deal of empirical and theoretical attention and prove dicult, if not impos-
sible, to accommodate within the classical theory of choice are framing eects, menu
eects, dependence on reference points, cyclic choice patterns, choice overload eects,
etc.
1 The violation in some instances of the maximization principle raises at least two
important questions:
Q.1: how severe are the deviations from the classical theory?
Q.2: what is the best way to extract relevant information from the choices of the
individual for the purposes of welfare analysis?
By properly addressing Q.1, it would be possible to evaluate whether the classical
theory of individual behavior is a reasonable way to describe behavior. That is, the
validity of the theory should not be based on whether or not individuals violate the
maximization principle in a given situation, but on how close their behavior is with
respect to this benchmark. Moreover, the availability of a reliable tool to assess the
distance between actual behavior and behavior consistent with the maximization of a
preference relation will enable interpersonal comparisons. This, in turn, may improve
our understanding of individual behavior and may also prove crucial in the development
of future choice models, which may take the distribution of the degree of consistency
of the individuals as one of their primitives. Furthermore, the possibility of performing
meaningful comparisons of rationality will allow evaluation of deviations between vari-
ous alternative models of choice and, hence, provide a tool to give some structure to the
rapidly growing literature on alternative individual decision-making models that are
expanding the classical notion of rationality (see footnote 1 for some recent examples).
1 As with the empirical ndings see, respectively, Tversky and Kahneman (1981), Tversky and
Simonson (1993), Thaler (1980), May (1954), and Iyengar and Lepper (2000). Some theoretical ac-
counts inspired by the above ndings expanding the classical notion of rationality and adopting a
revealed preference approach are Bossert and Sprumont (2003), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Manzini
and Mariotti (2007), Salant and Rubinstein (2008), Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2008), and Masatli-
oglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2010).3
By dealing with Q.2, it would be possible to identify, from an external perspective,
the good or bad alternatives for the individual even when the behavior of the individual
is not fully compatible with the maximization principle. This is of course of prime
relevance since welfare analysis is at the core of economics.
In principle, there is a wide range of dierent possible procedures in order to address
these two questions. In this paper we rst introduce the notion of an inconsistency
index that evaluates the inconsistency associated to a collection of revealed choices.
We then suggest a set of foundational conditions on inconsistency indices that identify
a new class of indices to measure the rationality of individuals that, at the same time,
enables individual welfare analysis using potentially inconsistent subjects. We call it
the class of minimal indices.
Minimal indices measure the inconsistency of the data by identifying the preference
relation that is closest to observed behavior. Distance is evaluated by additively con-
sidering every menu of alternatives when there is a divergence between the choice of
alternative dictated by the maximization principle and the one actually chosen by the
individual, and then by weighting such divergence by means of a collection of weights
that may depend on the preference relation, the menu of available alternatives, and
the chosen alternative. Minimal indices are therefore exible enough to evaluate the
inconsistency of choice not only by counting the number of menus in which the individ-
ual deviates from the maximization principle, but also by pondering each inconsistent
observation on the basis of the possible underlying values of the alternatives and the
various menus of alternatives, judged by the closest preference relation to the data.
Given the general formulation of weights in minimal indices, it follows that this class
of indices is a broad one encompassing a number of special cases. In this paper we
study in detail a version of the well-known Varian's index, and two new ones that we
call the minimal swaps index and the minimal loss index. Since each of them has its
own attractive features, we aim to gain a deeper understanding by establishing the
properties that, on top of those characterizing the class of minimal indices, uniquely
identify them.
2 This exercise should be informative to the analyst when choosing one
index over the others in applications.
Varian (1990) renes the rst suggestion in the literature measuring the consistency
of the data due to Afriat (1973). In a consumer setting, Afriat proposes to measure
2We also show, as a corollary, that the Houtman-Mak's index is a minimal index, and discuss its
characterization.4
the amount of relative wealth adjustment required in each budget constraint to avoid
all violations of the maximization principle. The suggestion of Varian is to consider
potentially dierent levels of wealth adjustments in the dierent observations, and then
measure the total wealth adjustment that is necessary in order to rationalize all the
choices. In spite of the fact of its very dierent formulations, we show that in our
setting the Varian's index belongs to the class of minimal indices. This exemplies the
compatibility of minimal indices with the use of exogenous information to the revealed
choices.
The minimal swaps index is the rst of the new indices belonging to the broad class
of minimal indices that we introduce in this paper. The minimal swaps index evaluates
the inconsistency of observations unexplained by a preference relation by enumerating
the number of available alternatives in the menus that are above the chosen ones
according to the preference relation. That is, it counts in each menu the number of
alternatives that need to be swapped with the chosen alternative in order to explain the
choices of the individual. Hence, the minimal swaps index is given by the preference
relation that minimizes the total number of swaps in all the observations. Importantly,
this index judges the inconsistency in the choices of an individual by using exclusively
the information that arises endogenously from the revealed preference that is closest
to the data.
The minimal loss index, the second new index belonging to the class of minimal
indices that we put forward in this paper, also uses the information arising endogenously
from the revealed choices of the individual, in addition to some exogenous cardinal
information. Suppose that the analyst has information on the cardinal utility values of
the dierent alternatives, based on their position in the ranking. Then, minimal loss
indices evaluate an inconsistent observation by attending to the dierence in the utility
values associated to the maximal available alternative in the menu and to the chosen
alternative. This can be interpreted as the utility loss for the inconsistent choice in
that observation. Then, the minimal loss index is given by the preference relation that
minimizes the sum of utility losses.
The structure of minimal indices immediately suggests a way to deal with individual
welfare. Minimal indices focus on the preference relation that minimizes the incon-
sistency with the data and that can be interpreted as the best approximation of the
individual's actual choices. It is then natural to use this preference relation as the
instrument to make welfare analysis. The main advantages of such an approach are5
that the relevant preference relation is identied from a foundational analysis, and that
the preference relation is well-behaved in the sense of being a linear order and hence
its maximization oers a unique alternative in any possible menu of alternatives, thus
providing the policy maker with a clear guideline.
We then contrast our approach to welfare analysis with two prominent suggestions
in the literature, Bernheim and Rangel (2009) and Green and Hojman (2009). This
exercise illustrates that the ranking of any two alternatives in the preference resulting
from our approach is constructed taking into consideration the whole data set, and not
just those observations where the two alternatives are present. In principle, therefore,
the welfare criterion that we suggest endogenizes all the consequences of ranking one
alternative over another, and hence it may be more informative for the policy maker.
Our paper draws on two signicant strands of literature. The rst is the literature on
revealed preference tests of the maximization principle. These tests are typically run
on consumer behavior data, with no axiomatic foundation. As we mentioned above,
the rst to propose this type of test was Afriat (1973), that suggested measuring the
amount of adjustment required in each budget constraint to avoid any violation of
the maximization principle. Chalfant and Alston (1988) and Varian (1990) further
developed Afriat's approach. Another proposal is to count the number of violations of
consistency with the maximization principle detected in the data. In this respect, see
the work of Swoord and Whitney (1987) and Famulari (1995). Yet a third approach
computes the maximal subset of the data that is consistent with the maximization
principle. Papers following this approach are Houtman and Maks (1985) and Banker
and Maindiratta (1988). In a recent paper, Dean and Martin (2010) provide a powerful
algorithm to compute such a maximal subset of the data. We devote section 2 to review
these tests within the framework we propose in this paper.
The second includes a growing number of papers dealing with individual welfare
analysis, even when the individual's behavior is inconsistent. Bernheim and Rangel
(2009) add to the standard revealed choice data the notion of ancillary conditions, or
frames. Ancillary conditions are assumed to be observable and may aect individual
choice, but are irrelevant in terms of the welfare associated with the chosen alternative.
Bernheim and Rangel suggest a Pareto-type welfare preference relation that ranks an
alternative as welfare-superior to another only if the latter is never chosen when the
former is available. It is clear that this method may provide an incomplete preference
relation, and hence in occasions will be uninformative. Chambers and Hayashi (2009)6
characterize an extension of Bernheim and Rangel's model to probabilistic settings,
providing a complete welfare ranking. Manzini and Mariotti (2009) oer a critical
assessment of Bernheim and Rangel. A dierent view on the question of behavioral
welfare analysis is discussed in Koszegi and Rabin (2007) where welfare analysis is
proposed to be done by studying the information regarding the cognitive process that
underlies the choices of the individual. In this line, Rubinstein and Salant (2011)
propose the welfare relation that is consistent with a set of preference relations in
the sense that all the preference relations in the set could have been generated by
the cognitive process distorting that welfare relation. Also consistent with this view,
Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2010) suggest a welfare preference based on their
limited attention model of decision-making. Alternatively, Green and Hojman (2009)
suggest identifying a list of conicting selves, which, when aggregated, induce the
revealed choices, and then using the aggregation rule to make the individual welfare-
analysis. Finally, Baldiga and Green (2010) analyze the conict between preference
relations in terms of their disagreement on choice. They then use their measures
of conict between preference relations together with Green and Hojman's notion of
multiple-selves to nd the list of multiple-selves with the minimal internal conict that
explain a given choice data, and suggest this as a welfare measure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally presents our envi-
ronment, reviews the most prominent classical measures that have been suggested in
the literature, and introduces the class of minimal indices. In section 3 we lay down
the axiomatic characterization of minimal indices. Then, section 4 is devoted to the
study of various especially prominent cases of minimal indices: Varian's, Houtman-
Mak's, minimal swaps and minimal loss indices. Section 5 introduces our approach
to individual welfare with potentially inconsistent individuals, compares it with two
prominent suggestions in the literature, Bernheim and Rangel (2009) and Green and
Hojman (2009), and discusses the interpretation of minimal indices in light of these
two approaches. Section 6 deals with the question of computing the index in practice
and obtaining the optimal preference relation from the data. Section 7 concludes. All
the proofs are contained in the appendix.
2. Measures of Rationality
Let X be a nite set of k alternatives. An observation is a pair (A;a), where A  X
is a non-empty menu of alternatives and a 2 A is the chosen alternative. Denote7
by O the set of all possible observations. A collection of observations is a mapping
f : O ! Z+, indicating the number of times each observation (A;a) occurs. Note that
we allow for the possibility that the same menu A may be in f more than once, with
the same or dierent associated chosen elements. Denote by F the set of all possible
collections of observations.
A preference relation P is a strict linear order on X, that is, an asymmetric, transi-
tive, and connected binary relation. Denote by P the set of all possible linear orders
on X. The collection of observations f is rationalizable if there exists a preference
relation P that explains the collection of observations, i.e., m(P;A) = a whenever
f(A;a) > 0, where m(P;A) represents the maximal element in A according to P.
That is, f is rationalizable if every single observation that is registered at least once in
f can be explained by the maximization of the same preference relation. Clearly, not
every collection of observations is rationalizable. An inconsistency index is a mapping
I : F ! R+ that measures how inconsistent (or how far away from rationalizability) a
collection of observations is. We now formally introduce in our framework some incon-
sistency indices that have been suggested in the literature, and a new family of indices
that we call minimal indices.
2.1. Classical Indices of Inconsistency. To the best of our knowledge, Afriat (1973)
proposes the rst method measuring the inconsistency of behavior. In a consumer
setting, Afriat suggests to measure the amount of relative wealth adjustment required
in each budget constraint to avoid all violations of the maximization principle. The idea
is that when a portion of the wealth is considered, the budget set shrinks eliminating
some revealed information, and hence some inconsistencies in the data may vanish.
Then, the degree of inconsistency of a collection of observations that Afriat proposes
is associated to the minimal necessary wealth adjustment that makes all the data
consistent with the maximization principle.
In order to represent Afriat's measure in our setting, we consider the notion of the
level of attention the individual pays to the menu of alternatives, along the lines sug-
gested by Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2010). An attention mapping  assigns
to every menu A the alternatives that are considered at the attention level e 2 [0;1].
The mapping  satises the following conditions: (1) (A;0) = ;, (2) (A;1) = A, and
(3) (A;e) is increasing in e. That is, when there is no attention, e = 0, no alternative
is considered, while when there is full attention, e = 1, all the alternatives in the menu
are considered. The higher the attention level, the more alternatives are considered in8
A. In this context, the question is how much inattention on the part of the individual
one needs to assume in order to rationalize all her choices.
It is important to make clear here that the severity of the violations is captured using
information unrelated to the revealed preference. In our formulation, the severity is
captured by the exogenous attention mapping , which plays the role of the budget set
adjustments in the original Afriat's consumer setup. That is, both, in the consumer
setting and in our general formulation, the way of capturing the severity of a violation
makes use of some exogenous structure of the menus of alternatives.
For any attention mapping , collection of observations f, and level of attention e 2
[0;1], consider the revealed preference dened by xR

f;ey , 9(A;x) with f(A;x) > 0
and y 2 (A;e): That is, x is revealed preferred to y if, given the attention mapping
, there is an observation where x is chosen and y is observed at the attention level e.
If the level of attention is equal to 1, this is merely the standard revealed preference
relation. If the level of attention is equal to 0, there is no revelation from the data since
no alternative is observed. The less attention is assumed, the less revealed information
and the less likely inconsistencies are to appear. There is then a limit value of e at which
the revealed preference R

f;e does not contain any cycle and hence, it is compatible with






The inconsistency value of the collection of observations f according to the index IAf
is the lowest possible level of inattention (1   e) such that the revealed preference at
attention level e is acyclic. We now illustrate this measure and some of its limitations
by using a simple example.
Let X = fx;y;zg and let the perception of a menu of alternatives depend on the
individual's level of attention, as follows. If her level of attention is low, the individual
will perceive no alternative. If her level of attention is intermediate, the individual will
perceive alternatives y and z, whenever these are available. If her level of attention is





; if e  1=4;
A \ fy;zg if 1=4 < e  3=4;
A \ fx;y;zg if 3=4 < e:
In order to be perceived, alternatives x;y and z require attention levels above 3=4, 1=4
and 1=4, respectively. Consider now the collection of observations f such that the only9
observations are f(fx;yg;x) = 2 and f(fy;zg;y) = f(fx;zg;z) = f(fx;y;zg;x) = 1.
That is, f reveals a cycle in the binary menus of alternatives, and another cycle given
by (fx;zg;z) and (fx;y;zg;x). Note that both cycles disappear if alternative x is
not considered in the menu (fx;zg;z). Given , this is guaranteed at the level of
attention e = 3=4. At such level of attention the observation (fx;zg;z) no longer
reveals that z is preferred to x, i.e. it is not the case that zR

f;3=4x. It then follows that
IAf(f) = 1   3=4 = 1=4.
Consider now a collection of observations g consisting of the same observations in
f except that the choice from fx;y;zg is alternative y instead of x. Notice that on
top of the same cycle involving the binary menus of alternatives, g contains the cycles
generated by g(fx;yg;x) = 2 and g(fx;y;zg;y) = 1. The collection of observations
g can be rationalized if alternative x is neither observed from (fx;zg;z) nor from
(fx;y;zg;y). This follows at the level of attention e = 3=4 and consequently, IAf(g) =
1   3=4 = 1=4 = IAf(f).
We conclude therefore, that at the light of Afriat's index, both f and g are identical
in terms of their inconsistency value. It may be natural to argue, however, that a
reasonable measure of rationality should assign a higher inconsistency value to g than
to f, since one needs to assume the individual ignores alternatives more often in the
former than in the latter.
In our setting, Varian's (1990) renement of Afriat's measure of inconsistency can be
presented as follows. Varian addresses the question of how much aggregated inattention
on the part of the individual one needs to assume in order to rationalize all her choices.
In order to do so, he considers potentially dierent levels of attention in the dierent
observations e = fe(A;a)g, instead of a single level of attention e for all the observations.
Then, for any attention mapping , collection of observations f, and vector of levels
of attention e, consider the revealed preference dened by xR

f;ey , 9(A;x) with
f(A;x) > 0 and y 2 (A;e(A;x)): We are interested in the vector of attention levels e,
closest to 1, that makes R









3Varian's original denition considers any possible norm. For tractability, we here use the linear
version.10
To illustrate this index consider again the above example. It is easy to see that the
optimal vector e for f is given by e(fx;zg;z) = 3=4 and e(fx;yg;x) = e(fy;zg;y) = e(fx;y;zg;x) =
1, implying a Varian's degree of inconsistency equal to 1=4. The optimal vector e0 for g
is given by e0
(fx;zg;z) = e0
(fx;y;zg;y) = 3=4 and e0
(fy;zg;y) = e0
(fx;yg;x) = 1, implying a Varian's
degree of inconsistency equal to IV(g) = 1=2 > 1=4 = IV(f).
Hence, unlike in the case of Afriat's index, since Varian's index is sensitive to both,
the number and the severity of unexplained observations, it discriminates between col-
lections of observations f and g.
Houtman and Maks (1985) propose considering the minimal subset of observations
that needs to be eliminated from the data in order to make the remainder rationalizable.







The following example illustrates this measure of rationality. Consider the collec-
tions of observations f1 and f2 given by f1(fx;yg;x) = f1(fy;zg;y) = f2(fx;yg;x) =
f2(fy;zg;y) = 3 and f1(fx;y;zg;y) = f2(fx;y;zg;z) = 1. That is, f1 and f2 share the
same menus of alternatives, and also the same choices, except for menu fx;y;zg. It fol-
lows that the maximal subsets consistent with the maximization principle of collections
f1 and f2 coincide. In both cases, it involves eliminating the observation related to
menu fx;y;zg. The inconsistency index associated to both collections of observations
is therefore equal to 1.
Notice that the revealed preference associated to the maximal subsets of f1 and f2
consistent with the maximization principle establishes, in both cases, that x is better
than y, and y better than z. In this light, it seems logical to argue that the inconsistent
choice in f1, namely (fx;y;zg;y), is less severe than that in f2, (fx;y;zg;z), since the
latter selects the worst possible alternative, while the former selects the intermediate
one. However, IHM, by only counting the number of menus that cannot be rationalized,
ignores the severity of the inconsistencies.
Finally, rationality has also been measured by counting the number of times in
the data a consistency property is violated (see, e.g., Swoord and Whitney, 1987).
Depending on the setting, the consistency property may be WARP, or GARP, or11
SARP, or IIA. This measure has exactly the same limitation as the one above, in that
it takes into consideration the number of violations, but not their severity.4
2.2. Minimal Indices. We now propose a new and broad family of indices that we
call minimal indices. The basic idea of minimal indices is to consider every possible
inconsistency between an observation (A;a) and a preference relation P through a
weight that may depend on the nature of the menu of alternatives A, the chosen
alternative a, and the preference relation P. Then, for a given collection of observations
f, the inconsistency index takes the form of the minimum total inconsistency across
all preference relations. This approach represents a very exible way of measuring the
inconsistency of an individual and at the same time it highlights the preference relation
that is closest to the data, enabling welfare analysis.
In order to formally introduce the class of minimal indices consider rst a mapping w :
PO ! R+ such that w(P;A;a) = 0 if and only if a = m(P;A). That is, observations
that are explained by the preference P receive a null weight, while any other observation







The generality of the weights w(P;A;a) allows us to consider various types of informa-
tion on the measurement of inconsistencies. Minimal indices may consider the nature
of the menus of alternatives, the nature of the chosen alternatives, and all this is judged
on the basis of the closest preference relation to the data. Hence, minimal indices may
make use of the endogenous information arising from the revealed choices in dierent
ways, and also of dierent types of exogenous information related to the characteristics
of the chosen alternatives or the menus of alternatives. Consequently, minimal indices
encompass a broad class of special cases, each one with its own characteristics, and its
own way of using exogenous or endogenous information to the revealed choices. We
illustrate this by highlighting four special cases.
We start the analysis of special cases of minimal indices by showing that, despite
its very dierent formulation, the Varian's index belongs to it. This exemplies the
4Echenique, Lee and Shum (2010) make use of the monetary structure of budget sets to suggest a
version of this notion, the money pump index, that captures also the severity of each violation. They
consider the total wealth lost in all revealed cycles.12
possible use of external information to the revealed choices that are nevertheless at the
core of our measure of rationality.
Proposition 1. For every attention mapping, the associated Varian's index is a mi-
nimal index.
The weight associated to observation (A;a) and preference P that makes the Varian's
index a minimal index takes the following form: it is one minus the largest level of
attention for observation (A;a) for which none of the alternatives that dominates a
according to P is observed by the individual.
Indeed, in our setting, it is not dicult to see that the inconsistency index IHM
is but a special case of a Varian's index when the attention mapping takes the form
(A;e) = A for all e > 0. Hence, given Proposition 1, the Houtman-Maks' index is
also a minimal index. We omit the formal proof of this immediate fact.
Proposition 2. The Houtman-Maks' index is a minimal index.
But the family of minimal indices allows for more general weights than those consid-
ered in the previous two indices. We now introduce two new special cases that focus in
dierent ways on the endogenous information that emerges from the revealed choices.
We call them minimal swaps indices and minimal loss indices. While the former ex-
clusively uses the information contained in the revealed choices, the latter makes use
also of exogenous information on the cardinal values of the alternatives.
Let us start by introducing the minimal swaps indices. Consider an observation (A;a)
that is inconsistent with the maximization of a given preference relation P. This implies
that there is a number of alternatives in A that are preferred to the chosen alternative
a, according to P, but that are nevertheless ignored. A natural inconsistency measure
of P with regard to (A;a) entails counting the number of alternatives in A above
the chosen one. These are the alternatives that need to be swapped with the chosen
alternative in order to explain the choice. Then, the minimal swaps index is given by





f(A;a)jfx 2 A : xPagj:
To illustrate this index, consider again the example we introduced in the discussion
of index IHM. The optimal preference for both f1 and f2 is given by xPyPz, that
only fails to explain the observations involving the grand set. The upper contour set13
of alternative y in fx;y;zg for such a P is composed by a unique alternative, x, and
hence, IS(f1) = 1. However, the upper contour set of alternative z in fx;y;zg for such
a P is composed by alternatives x and y and therefore, IS(f2) = 2 > IS(f1).
In the case of our second new special case of minimal indices, the minimal loss
indices, the measurement of the severity of each inconsistency uses the revealed pref-
erence, together with some cardinal information on it. Consider again an observation
(A;a) and a given preference relation P whose maximization in A is inconsistent with
a. In addition, suppose that one has information on the cardinal utility value of the
alternatives, based on their positions in the ranking.5 Then, one may value the incon-
sistency of P with regard to (A;a) by the dierence in the cardinal values associated to
the maximal element in A and the one associated to the chosen element a. Formally,
denote by b m(P;A) and b a(P) the rankings of alternatives m(P;A) and a in P. Now,
given a vector of real-valued weights u = (u1;:::;uk) such that u1 > u2 >  > uk, an





f(A;a)(ub m(P;A)   ub a(P)):
It is immediate that in the above mentioned example, the minimal loss index evalu-
ates the collections f1 and f2 as IL(f2) = u1   u3 > u1   u2 = IL(f1).
It therefore emerges that minimal indices represent a prominent and broad class
of inconsistency indices. It encompasses the Houtman-Maks' index, together with
other indices that take into consideration both the number of inconsistencies and their
severity, like the Varian's index, the minimal swaps index and the minimal loss index.
Furthermore, by allowing to measure the inconsistency of the data on the basis of
the closest preference relation to the revealed choices, it proposes a tool to do welfare
analysis. Consequently, we aim to gain a deeper understanding of the class of minimal
indices. For this purpose, we now provide a complete characterization of them.
5For example, the cardinal utility values may be modeled as the random variables with a common
distribution, and then one may sort the realizations in decreasing order of magnitude to focus on the
order statistics. The expected value of the order statistics may be taken as the cardinal values of the
alternatives based on their ranking, as in Apesteguia, Ballester and Ferrer (2011).14
3. A Characterization of Minimal Indices
In this section we propose four conditions that an inconsistency index I should
desirably satisfy. The four conditions shape the treatment that an inconsistency index
I should ideally give to various sorts of collections of observations. We then show
that the minimal indices, and only them, satisfy this set of four properties. Our rst
characterizing property is the following.
Rationality (RAT). Let f 2 F, I(f) = 0 , f is rationalizable.
Rationality imposes that a collection of observations has an inconsistency value of 0
if and only if the collection is rationalizable. Since by denition an inconsistency index
I assigns non-negative numbers to any possible collection of observations, Rationality
imposes a weak monotonicity requirement. In line with the maximization principle, the
minimal inconsistency level is reached only when every single choice in the collection
of observations can be explained by maximizing a preference relation. The property
normalizes the smallest inconsistency level by assigning a value of 0 to this case and a
strictly higher inconsistency level to any other case.
In order to introduce our next property, consider rst the following denition. Denote
by r a rationalizable collection of observations where all the binary menus are observed
and by R the set of all such collections of observations. Clearly, for every r 2 R there
exists a unique preference relation, that we denote by P r, that rationalizes r. Given
f and r, we say that f is r-invariant if I(f) = I(f + r). That is we say that f is
r-invariant whenever the addition of r to f leaves the inconsistency level associated to
f unchanged.
Invariance (INV). For every f 2 F, there exists r 2 R such that f is r-invariant.
Invariance implies that every possible collection of observations can be related to
some rationalizable collection of observations involving the binary menus of alterna-
tives. No matter the nature of the collection of observations f, there is an r that
when added to f does not increase the inconsistency associated to f. In other words,
Invariance imposes that any f has at least one close enough rationalizable collection of
observations that can be added without consequences on the total inconsistency value.
Attraction (ATTR). For every f 2 F and every r 2 R, there exists a positive integer
z such that f + zr is r-invariant.
Consider any collection of observations f and any rationalizable collection r. Attrac-
tion establishes that if some structured data r is added suciently often to f, extra15
information conrming the structured data becomes inessential, in the sense of leaving
the inconsistency of the data unchanged. While Invariance imposes the existence of a
rationalizable collection r that makes f r-invariant, Attraction says that f +zr will be
r-invariant as long as r is made suciently important in the database.
Separability (SEP). For every f;g 2 F, I(f +g)  I(f)+I(g), with equality if and
only if f and g are r-invariant for some r 2 R.
Take any two collections of observations f and g. Separability judges that the sum
of the inconsistency of f and that of g can never be greater than the inconsistency
associated to the collection of observations resulting from f and g together. To illus-
trate, suppose that f and g are both rationalizable when taken separately. Clearly,
the conjunction of f and g does not need to be rationalizable, and hence arguably the
collection of observations f + g can only take the same or a larger inconsistency value
than the sum of the inconsistency values of the two collections separately. The same
idea applies when either f or g or both are not rationalizable. The sum of f and g
can only generate the same or more frictions with the rationalizability principle, and
hence should get the same or a larger inconsistency value. Further, Separability also
states that in the special case where both f and g are related to the same rationalizable
collection of observations r, then the inconsistency of f+g should be the same than the
sum of the inconsistencies of f and g taken separately. The rationale for this second
implication of Separability is that if f and g share a common structure, that is both
are r-invariant with the same r, the two collections are analogous enough so that they
can be aggregated without further consequences on the inconsistency value.
Theorem 1 shows that these four properties uniquely characterize the class of minimal
indices.
Theorem 1. An inconsistency index I satises (RAT), (INV), (ATTR) and (SEP) if
and only if it is a minimal index.
The intuition of the only if part of the proof can be grasped by considering the
following four steps.
(1) Categorization: We start by relating any collection of observations f with one
of the rationalizable collections of observations r involving all binary menus of
alternatives, such that f is r-invariant. This provides the preference relation
P r that will be shown to be the closest to the rationalization of f. Invariance
guarantees that such a rationalizable collection r exists.16
(2) Separation: We then show that the four properties guarantee that we can




nr). That is, we can separate the inconsistency
of f on the basis of the dierent observations (A;a) and weight each one of these
observations by I(1(A;a) + zr
nr). The latter denotes the inconsistency value
assigned to the collection formed by the observation (A;a), 1(A;a), together
with zr
n times the rationalizable collection r. The integer zr
n guarantees, by
Attraction, that any possible collection of n or fewer observations is r-invariant.
(3) Representation: Next, we dene the weighting mapping w as w(P r;A;a) = 0
whenever P r rationalizes the observation (A;a), and w(P r;A;a) = I(1(A;a) +
zr
1r) otherwise. By using (SEP) and (RAT) we can equate the values I(1(A;a)+
zr
1r) and I(1(A;a)+zr
nr), and then it follows that I(f) =
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P r;A;a).
(4) Minimality: Finally, for any other preference P 0 we can consider the associated
collection r0. By (ATTR) and the previous representation, for z large enough we
know that I(f + zr0) =
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P 0;A;a). (SEP) guarantees that this
value is larger or equal than I(f)+ I(zr0), and (RAT) leads to I(f)+ I(zr0) =
I(f) =
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P r;A;a), as desired.
4. Special Cases of Minimal Indices
We have argued that the class of minimal indices is a prominent one. It is a gen-
eral and exible class encompassing a number of inconsistency indices, some of them
sharing an attractive feature: being sensitive to both the number of inconsistencies
and their severity. We now study in detail four special cases of minimal indices, the
Houtman-Maks', Varian's, minimal swaps and minimal loss indices, by providing a
characterization for each one of the cases. The characterization results are all based on
the system of properties characterizing the minimal indices, and add extra structure
in order to capture the specic nature of the dierent classes. This exercise enhances
the understanding of the dierent indices by stressing the additional structure that is
needed in order to obtain the desired representation, facilitating the evaluation of the
similarities and dierences between them and helping the observer to decide which of
these indices to use in applications.
4.1. Varian's Index. We introduce two new properties on an inconsistency index,
that together with the four properties we discuss in the previous section characterize the
Varian's index. In order to grasp the need of the rst new property, Upper Consistency,17
note that the Varian's index is only concerned with those alternatives which are above
the chosen one in the optimal preference relation. These are the alternatives that the
individual ignores when making a choice. In other words, we need to focus on the
upper contour sets of the chosen alternatives. Denote by UA
P (x) the upper contour set
of alternative x in A with respect to the preference P, i.e., UA
P (x) = fy 2 A : yPxg.
Upper Consistency (UC). For every, f;g;1(A;x);1(A;y) 2 F and every r;r0 2 R, if f
and f + 1(A;x) are r-invariant, g and g + 1(A;y) are r0-invariant, UA
Pr(x) = UA
Pr0(y), and
I(f) = I(g) then I(f + 1(A;x)) = I(g + 1(A;y)).
Upper Consistency imposes conditions on when one can be sure that the addition of
two observations, (A;x) and (A;y), to two collections of observations, f and g, respec-
tively, has no consequences on the evaluation of the inconsistency levels associated to
the resulting two collections of observations, f +1(A;x) and g+1(A;y). First, both f and
f + 1(A;x) and g and g + 1(A;y) must be part of a common structure, since they must
share the same rationalizable collection of observations, r and r0, respectively. Second,
the upper contour sets of the chosen alternatives x and y in the menu A with respective
preferences P r and P r0 must be identical. If in addition to these conditions, the incon-
sistency index judges f and g as equally inconsistent, then Upper Consistency imply
that the inconsistency levels associated to f + 1(A;x) and g + 1(A;y) must also coincide.
Note, therefore, that Upper Consistency is a weak property, since it imposes structure
on the consequences of adding new data, only under a number of requirements that
impose a great deal of similarity between the observations.
Our second new property for the characterization of the Varian's index aims to cap-
ture another main feature of the index. Note that among all the information contained
in the upper contour set of the chosen alternative in an inconsistent observation, the
Varian's index only considers the alternative with the highest associated inattention so
that it is ignored in the revealed choice. Clearly, if such an alternative is ignored, all
other alternatives in the upper contour set are also ignored. In order to introduce our
second property, Preference Irrelevance, let rx;a 2 R denote the collection of rational-
izable binary observations such that x is always chosen whenever it is present, and a
is also always chosen whenever present except against x.
Preference Irrelevance (PI). For every rR and every 1(A;a) 2 F with UA
Pr(a) 6= ;,
there exists a positive integer z such that I(1(A;a) +zr) = maxx2UA
Pr(a) I(1(A;a) +zrx;a).18
Take any observation (A;a) and any rationalizable collection r such that there is
at least one alternative in A that is preferred to the chosen alternative a according
to the preference relation P r. That is, judged on the basis of P r, the choice of a in
A is inconsistent. Preference Irrelevance says that there always exist a large enough
integer z such that the inconsistency of 1(A;a) +zr is exactly the one associated to the
inconsistency of the same observation (A;a), associated the same number of times z,
to the rationalizable collection of observations rx;a. In the collection rx;a the maximal
alternative x in A according to P r is always chosen whenever it is present and the same
for a, except when x is present. That is, according to Preference Irrelevance, given an
observation (A;a) and a rationalizable collection r, to evaluate the inconsistency of
1(A;a) + zr one can focus on the rationalizable collection rx;a that places the maximal
alternative in P r, alternative x, and the chosen alternative a, in the top two positions
of a preference relation P rx;a.
Theorem 2 shows that these two properties together with Rationality, Invariance,
Attraction and Separability uniquely characterize a positive scalar transformation of
the Varian's index. The requirement of the positive scalar transformation is necessary
to make the inconsistency values of certain collections of observations lie within the
unit interval, and hence construct the attention mapping , with image in the unit
interval, on the basis of them.
Theorem 2. An inconsistency index I satises (RAT), (INV), (ATTR), (SEP), (UC)
and (PI) if and only if I is a positive scalar transformation of the Varian's index.
We argued above that the Houtman-Maks' index IHM, counting the minimal subset
of the data that needs to be eliminated in order to make the remainder of the data con-
sistent with the maximization principle, is but a special case of the Varian's index with
attention mapping (A;e) = A for every e > 0. Consequently, the characterization
of IHM must build on that of IV, and impose some additional structure. Notice that
the particular attention mapping of the Houtman-Maks' index treats all alternatives
equally. That is, it does not discriminate between them, and hence any relabeling of
the alternatives should have no eect on the level of inconsistency. Indeed, it turns out
that we simply need to add a property imposing that the inconsistency index should
be independent of the names of the alternatives. In order to formally introduce this
notion, consider the following denition. Given a permutation  over the set of alterna-
tives X, for any collection of observations f we denote by (f) the permuted collection
of observations such that (f)(A;a) = f((A);(a)).19
Neutrality (NEU). For every permutation  and every f 2 F, I(f) = I((f)).
The following corollary of Theorem 2, that we state without proof, makes formal the
claim on IHM.
Corollary 1. An inconsistency index I satises (RAT), (INV), (ATTR), (SEP),
(UC), (PI) and (NEU) if and only if I is a positive scalar transformation of the
Houtman-Maks' index.
4.2. Minimal Swaps Index. The minimal swaps index measures how many binary
comparisons must be swapped in each observation in order to explain all the choices.
Note, therefore, that for the minimal swaps index all the relevant information in each
observation is again collected in those alternatives that, endogenously, become better
than the chosen one. Hence, Upper Consistency, the property we introduced above
with the purpose of focusing on the upper contour sets is needed in the case of the
minimal swaps index. Also, note that unlike the Varian's index but in line with the
Houtman-Maks' index, the minimal swaps index treats all the alternatives symmetri-
cally. That is, for the minimal swaps index the identity of the alternatives is inessential.
Hence, the property of Neutrality above introduced must be satised too. Preference
Irrelevance, on the other hand, is clearly violated by the minimal swaps index since
now all the alternatives in the upper contour set not only become equally relevant, but
are considered additively. Consequently, what is needed here is another property im-
posing structure on when two observations can be merged with no consequences on the
inconsistency value, and that it respects the importance of the number of alternatives
in the upper contour sets. One can capture this feature with the following property.
Disjoint Composition (DC). For every, f;1(A;x);1(B;x) 2 F and every r 2 R,
if f + 1(A;x) + 1(B;x) is r-invariant and A \ B = fxg then I(f + 1(A;x) + 1(B;x)) =
I(f + 1(A[B;x)):
Disjoint Composition establishes that under very special circumstances, two obser-
vations can be merged into one without aecting the inconsistency level. Take two
observations (A;x) and (B;x) that share the same chosen alternative x and nothing
else. That is, other than x the two menus A and B are disjoint. Suppose that these
two observations are added to a collection f resulting in a collection sharing a common
structure represented by the rationalizable collection r. Then, Disjoint Composition20
implies that the observations (A;x) and (B;x) can be merged into one single observa-
tion respecting the choice of x, (A [ B;x), with no consequences on the value of the
inconsistency.
Theorem 3 states the characterization result. In this case the requirement of the
positive scalar transformation is necessary to guarantee that the weight of every al-
ternative in every menu of alternatives placed above the chosen one according to any
preference relation gets a value of 1.
Theorem 3. An inconsistency index I satises (RAT), (INV), (ATTR), (SEP), (UC),
(NEU) and (DC) if and only if it is a positive scalar transformation of the minimal
swaps index.
4.3. Minimal Loss Index. The main distinctive feature of minimal loss indices is that
they care not only about the alternatives that are above the chosen one in the closest
preference relation, but about the ranking of all these alternatives. This immediately
implies that Upper Consistency and Preference Irrelevance are not satised since they
ignore this type of information. Furthermore, minimal loss indices also fail to satisfy
Disjoint Composition since merging two observations of the type dictated by Disjoint
Composition reduces the inconsistency in the minimal loss indices, as the loss associated
to the merged observation can indeed be tracked down to one of the observations; the
one in which the maximal alternative according to the optimal preference is located.
Instead of Disjoint Composition, what is needed here is another property establishing
when and how two observations can be merged and that incorporates information on
the ranking of alternatives. In order to introduce such a property, Composition, let us
denote by APB the case where all the alternatives in menu A are preferred by P to
all the alternatives in B.
Composition (COM). For every, f;1(A;x);1(B[fxg;y) 2 F and every r 2 R, if f +
1(A;x)+1(B[fxg;y) is r-invariant and AP rB then I(f+1(A;x)+1(B[fxg;y)) = I(f+1(A[B;y)):
Composition implies that to the inconsistency index I it is equivalent to observe a
given inconsistency at once, or separated into two very particular hypothetical stages.
That is, suppose that the collection of observations formed by (A;x), (B [fxg;y) and
f share a common structure such that are r-invariant, and that all the alternatives in
A are above all the alternatives in B according to the preference P r. Now, from (A;x)
it may be the case that the chosen element x is dierent from the maximal element
in A according to P r. Since all the alternatives in A are better according to P r than21
all the alternatives in B, it follows that x is the maximal alternative from the menu
B [ fxg. Again, it may be the case that the chosen alternative in this menu, y, is
dierent from the maximal alternative, x. If, on the other hand, all of the alternatives
A [ B are presented simultaneously and the choice is y, Composition implies that
the two possible inconsistencies in the previous scenario are equivalent to the one in
the latter. Note that while Disjoint Composition and Composition share a common
intuition, both properties are independent. Neither one implies the other. Indeed, it
is easy to see that all the previous indices fail to satisfy this property.
Since what matters to the minimal loss index is the ranking of the alternatives but
not the their nature, it clearly follows that Neutrality is satised. Theorem 4 estab-
lishes that these two properties, Neutrality and Composition, on top of the axiomatic
structure of minimal indices, characterize the minimal loss indices.
Theorem 4. An inconsistency index I satises (RAT), (INV), (ATTR), (SEP), (NEU)
and (COM) if and only if it is a minimal loss index.
5. Individual Welfare
Welfare analysis with inconsistent individuals is problematic, since there is no pref-
erence relation compatible with all the revealed choices of the individual. There are
two main approaches to the question of how to extract welfare relevant information
in these situations. The rst approach involves a choice model-free view, while the
second builds on a particular model of decision-making consistent with the behavior of
the individual.
In the choice model-free approach, the analyst is agnostic about the underlying
model the individual may follow and focus exclusively on the observable choice data.
That is, no particular assumption on the sources of the inconsistency of the choices
is done, and revealed choices are taken as the unique source of information to infer
individual welfare. This is the main perspective adopted by Bernheim and Rangel
(2009). Alternatively, the analyst may assume a particular choice model consistent with
the revealed choices of the individual, and use this model in order to infer individual
welfare. The underlying assumption is that the causes of the inconsistencies may22
provide valuable information about how to x the welfare ranking. This is the approach
taken by Green and Hojman (2009).6
Interestingly, Bernheim and Rangel (2009) and Green and Hojman (2009), following
these two dierent approaches, independently suggest the use of the same welfare
notion. Let us denote by P the Bernheim-Rangel-Green-Hojman preference, dened
as xPy if and only if there is no observation (A;y) with x 2 A such that f(A;y) > 0.
In other words, y is never chosen when x is available. Bernheim and Rangel show that
whenever every menu A in X is observed at least once, P is acyclic, and hence it is
consistent with the maximization principle.
We now wonder which is the relationship between P and the optimal preference
relation of a minimal index, P . It turns out to be the case that the two welfare rela-
tions are fundamentally dierent. That P  is not contained in P follows immediately,
since P  is a linear order, while P is acyclic and hence incomplete in general. In the
other direction, and more importantly, note that while P evaluates the ranking of two
alternatives x and y by attending exclusively to those menus of alternatives where
both x and y are available, to establish the ranking of two alternatives P  takes into
consideration all the observations together. Hence, P  and P may rank two alternative
in opposite directions. A simple example illustrates this point.
Consider a collection f composed by the following observations: f(fx;yg;x) =
f(fy;zg;y) = 3 and f(fx;y;zg;y) = f(fx;zg;z) = 1. Clearly, zPx since x is
never chosen in the presence of z. However, to evaluate the ranking of alterna-
tives x and z, the minimal index considers the whole collection f. Observations
f(fx;yg;x) = f(fy;zg;y) = 3 signify a strong argument for the preference xPyPz.
This preference implies a mistake in the observations f(fx;y;zg;y) = f(fx;zg;z) = 1,
but rationalizes the more frequent evidence of f(fx;yg;x) = f(fy;zg;y) = 3. Prefer-
ence P is in fact the optimal preference relation for the minimal swaps index and for
the minimal loss indices, independently of the vector of weights u. The argument can
be extended to any minimal index.
Theorem 5. For every weighting mapping w, there exists a collection of observations
f for which the optimal preference of the minimal index is not an extension of the
Bernheim-Rangel-Green-Hojman preference.
6Other proposals within this second approach are K oszegi and Rabin (2007), Masatlioglu, Nakajima
and Ozbay (2010), and Rubinstein and Salant (2011). See Green and Hojman (2009, section 4.2) for
a discussion of the two approaches.23
We close this section with a discussion on the interpretation of minimal indices, in
light of the two approaches mentioned above. Our view here is that minimal indices are
exible enough to be compatible with the two approximations to behavioral welfare
analysis. On the one hand, the analyst may adopt the weights w(P;A;a) that she
may consider the most appropriate from an axiomatic approach without adhering to a
specic model of choice. This approach is in line with the choice model-free approach.
Alternatively, the analyst may have in mind a particular model of choice and this may
dictate the weights w(P;A;a) to be considered. For example, the minimal loss index is
consistent with a model of decision making where the individual has a clear ranking of
the alternatives in mind u, but in occasions the available alternatives may experience
shocks that makes the individual to select an ex-ante suboptimal alternative. Then,
this particular model of choice would suggest the preference that minimizes the minimal
index, since this is ex-ante the best way to accommodate individual welfare.
6. Computation of the Optimal Preference Relation
We now deal with the question of obtaining in practice the preference relation that
minimizes the inconsistency associated to a collection of observations. Given that we
have imposed no restriction whatsoever on the nature of the collections of observations,
it is not surprising that nding the optimal preference relation may be computationally
complex. Fortunately, we can draw upon existing techniques that address computa-
tional problems that can be related to ours, and oer reasonably good solutions. In
this section we briey describe two of such techniques. We further suggest a third
method that involves the restriction of the data sets to special domains.
Globally-Optimal Techniques. The rst approach we stress here involves the search
for the globally optimal preference relation. Clearly, this may involve the use of com-
putationally heavy techniques, but that are orders of magnitude superior to the naive
approach of evaluating all the possible linear orders.
Houtman and Maks (1984) oer one such algorithm for the computation of the
maximal subset of the data consistent with the maximization of a preference relation.
It follows immediately that if such a subset is found, the computation of the preference
relation consistent with it is very simple. Dean and Martin (2010) show that the
minimum set covering problem (MSCP) is equivalent to the problem at hand, and
then argue that one can use the wide variety of algorithms that have been designed in24
the operations research literature to solve the MSCP. This allows Dean and Martin to
oer a powerful algorithm.
The same strategy can be adopted for other cases of minimal indices. To illus-
trate, consider the well-known linear ordering problem (LOP). Formally, the integer
LOP problem over the set of vertices Y and directed weighted edges that connect all
vertices x and y with (integer) cost cxy, consists of nding the linear order relation
over the set of vertices that minimizes the total aggregated cost. That is, if we de-




The LOP has been related to a wide variety of problems, including various economic
problems, particularly to the triangularization of input-output matrices for the study
of the hierarchical structures of the productive sectors in an economy. The literature
oers a good array of algorithms to solve this problem (see, e.g., Gr otschel, J unger,
and Reinelt (1984); see also Chaovalitwongse et al (2010) for a good introduction to
the LOP, a review of the algorithmic literature solving the LOP, and for the analysis of
one such algorithm). As the following result shows, we can directly use the algorithms
developed to solve the LOP to compute the optimal preference relation for the minimal
swaps index.
Theorem 6.
(1) For every f 2 F one can dene a LOP with vertices in X, the solution of which
provides the optimal preference for the minimal swaps index.
(2) For any LOP with vertices in X one can dene an f 2 F, its optimal preference
being the solution to the LOP.
Intuitively, the linear orders in the LOP are the preference relations in our setting
and the cost of having one alternative before the other is the inconsistency that arises
from revealed data. Note that the evaluation of the inconsistency associated to having
one alternative a over the other b is very simple for the case of the minimal swaps index.
It involves counting the number of observations where the chosen alternative is b but
a is present in the menu. Then, the computation of the optimal preference relation
requires attending all the inconsistency values associated to having one alternative over
the other, exactly like in the LOP. This makes that the algorithms that the literature
has oered to solve the LOP, or equivalently the triangularization of input-output
matrices, can be directly used in the case of the minimal swaps index.25
Although this approach can also be used for the case of the minimal loss index
or the Varian's index, the analysis becomes more cumbersome. When considering the
inconsistency associated to having one alternative above the other in the ranking, in the
minimal loss index it is necessary to evaluate whether a is not only present but maximal
in the menu, while in the Varian's index it is necessary to consider the attention levels
to determine whether alternative a is observed at each stage.
Iterative Improvement Strategies. Algorithms computing the globally optimal
solution may be, on occasions, too heavy computationally speaking. For this reason
the literature also oers methods that whilst they do not compute the globally optimal
solution are much lighter in terms of the required computational intensity, giving good
approximations. The LOP is not an exception and there is a variety of techniques
searching for locally optimal solutions. The iterative improvement strategies represent
one prominent example (see Brusco, Kohn and Stahl (2008) for a good introduction
and relevant references). This technique has been intensively used in the problem of
the triangularization of input-output matrices (see, e.g., Korte and Oberhofer 1970,
Fukui 1986, and Howe 1991).
The main idea of this technique in the context of our setting involves the considera-
tion of an initial preference P and its associated inconsistency value. Then, it consists
of the interchange of sets of consecutive alternatives in the original preference P, result-
ing into a new preference P 0 with a lower inconsistency value. This process is iterated
until no more interchanges further improve the explanation of the data. Clearly, ex-
actly the same considerations with regard to the minimal swaps, the minimal loss and
the Varian's index we argue above for the globally optimal techniques apply here.
Ecient Computations in Relevant Domains. A third approach is to consider
special choice domains where one can identify the optimal preference relation eciently.
We illustrate this methodology by suggesting a domain of data sets that although it is
general enough to include the classical domains considered in the literature and many
others, it has a special structure that allows the computation of the optimal preference
relation for the minimal loss index practically costless.
We say that a collection f is balanced if all the menus of alternatives of the same car-




y2B f(B;y). The class of balanced collections of observations encompasses classical
domains, such as the universal domain, where all possible menus are observed once,
or the binary domain, where all possible menus of two alternatives are observed once,26
etc. It also includes replicas of these domains, thus enabling the study of variability in
choices from the same menu.
We show below that in these domains, for the case of the minimal loss index, the
preference relation that places the most frequently chosen alternatives higher in the
ranking is the optimal one. We call such preference relations basic. Formally, given




(A;a):a=y f(A;a) ) xP B(f)y: Clearly, such a preference relation
is extremely easy to compute. Hence, the following result is of substantial interest.
Theorem 7. For any balanced collection of observations f, and for any vector u, P
is an optimal preference relation for the minimal loss index if and only if P is a basic
preference relation for f.
7. Conclusions
It is now widely accepted that individual behavior often deviates from the maximiza-
tion principle. It is therefore crucial to assign a proper meaning to such deviations,
since this would not only give a sense of the reliability of classical choice theory in
dierent environments, but would also provide useful information to theorists for the
future development of the eld. In this paper we identify from a foundational analy-
sis a particular measure of the rationality of individuals, the class of minimal indices.
We argue that minimal indices have several attractive characteristics. Minimal indices
evaluate the inconsistency of the data by identifying the preference relation that is
closest to observed behavior. For this purpose, it additively evaluates all the observa-
tions where the individual's revealed choice does not correspond to the maximization
of the identied preference relation. The weight of each inconsistent choice may de-
pend on the nature of the available menu of alternatives, the chosen alternative and
the preference under consideration.
Given the generality of the weighting of the inconsistencies, minimal indices represent
a broad class of inconsistency measures. We explore in detail various special cases, in
particular the well-known Varian's index, and two new indices that we suggest here, the
minimal swaps index and the minimal loss index. Each one of these indices, although
sharing the structure of minimal indices, are fundamentally dierent and approach the
problem of measuring the inconsistency of the data from dierent angles. In order to
provide a deep understanding of each of these three indices, we provide an axiomatic
characterization of them.27
Our measure of rationality provides a tool for the conduction of welfare analysis even
with inconsistent decision makers. Clearly, if there is no preference relation compatible
with all the revealed choices, classical welfare analysis is a challenge. We suggest the
preference relation minimizing the minimal index as a sound tool for this purpose. The
main advantages of this are that it is the closest preference relation to the data, it is
well behaved in the sense of identifying a single alternative in any possible situation,
and it is axiomatically founded.
We see several avenues for future research. On the theoretical side, it is important
to elucidate the power of minimal indices, in the sense of providing the measure of
inconsistency contingent on the maximum degree attainable (see Bronars (1987) and
Beatty and Crawford (2010) for treatments of specic measures). On the empirical side,
one would like to see the application of minimal indices for the actual computation of
inconsistency in various settings.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Let  be an attention mapping and IV the associated Var-
ian's index. Dene for every preference relation P and every observation (A;a) the
weight w(P;A;a) = 1   supUA
P (a)\(A;e)=; e. The weight w(P;A;a) is therefore deter-
mined by the largest value of e at which no alternative that dominates a according to
P is observed by the individual. We now show that for every collection of observations
f, it is IV(f) = minP2P
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P;A;a):
First, let e be a vector of attention levels such that (1) IV(f) =
P
(A;a) f(A;a)(1  
e(A;a)), and (2) R

f;e0 is acyclic for every vector of attention levels e0 with e0
(A;a)  e(A;a),
where there is at least an (A;a) with f(A;a) > 0 and e(A;a) > 0 for which the inequality
is strict. Consider a preference relation P  that is a linear extension of all the acyclic
preferences R

f;e0. Given the denition of the Varian's index, e exists and P  is well-
dened.
We now prove that IV(f) =
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P ;A;a): We need to show that for
every (A;a) such that f(A;a) > 0, it must be 1   e(A;a) = w(P ;A;a) = 1  
supUA
P(a)\(A;e)=; e. Suppose otherwise. If 1   e(A;a) < 1   supUA
P(a)\(A;e)=; e, we
can consider a vector e0 equal to e in all its components except that e(A;a) > e0
(A;a) >
supUA
P(a)\(A;e)=; e. Hence, there exists an element x with xP a that is observed in
menu A for level of attention e0
(A;a), implying that aR

f;e0x. This contradicts the
denition of P . Suppose, then, that there is an observation (A;a) in f such that28
1   e(A;a) > 1   supUA
P(a)\(A;e)=; e. Then we can consider a vector e0 equal to e in all
its components except that e(A;a) < e0
(A;a) < supUA
P(a)\(A;e)=; e. The observation (A;a)
can only reveal alternative a to be preferred to alternatives below a in P , if any. This
contradicts the optimality of e in the Varian's index.
Second, we prove that, for every P 2 P, IV(f) 
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P;A;a): Suppose
otherwise and let P 0 be a preference relation such that IV(f) >
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P 0;A;a):
Dene the vector of attention levels e0 by e0
(A;a) = 1   w(P 0;A;a). Consider andy vec-
tor of attention levels e00 with e00
(A;a)  e0
(A;a), where there is at least an (A;a) with
f(A;a) > 0 and e0
(A;a) > 0 for which the inequality is strict. Then, for every such
e00 the preference R

f;e00 only contains information of the following form: the chosen
alternative a in A is revealed preferred to alternatives in A that are below a accord-











0;A;a) < IV(f) a contradic-
tion with the denition of the Varian's index.
Proof of Theorem 1: It is easy to see that any minimal index IM satises the axioms.
We prove the converse statement by way of ve lemmas.
Lemma 1. For every r 2 R, f 2 F, and z 2 Z++, (1) zr is r-invariant, and (2) if f
is r-invariant, then f + zr is r-invariant.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider any r 2 R, f 2 F, and z 2 Z++. By (RAT), we
know that I(zr) = I((z + 1)r) = 0. Hence, zr is r-invariant. This shows the rst
claim. Now, since zr and (z+1)r are r-invariant, if f is r-invariant (SEP) implies that
I(f + zr) = I(f) + I(zr) and I(f + (z + 1)r) = I(f) + I((z + 1)r). By (RAT), we
know that I(zr) = I((z + 1)r) = 0: Hence, I(f + zr) = I(f) = I(f + (z + 1)r) and
then f + zr is r-invariant. This shows the second claim.




(A;a) f(A;a)  n, then f + zr
nr is r-invariant.






f is the minimal value in Z++ such that f + zr
fr is r-invariant. Notice that
(ATTR) guarantees that zr
f always exists and the niteness of X guarantees that zr
n
is well-dened. Then, if
P
(A;a) f(A;a)  n, it follows that zr
n  zr
f and by Lemma 1,
f + zr
nr is r-invariant, as desired.29
Lemma 3. For every r 2 R and n 2 Z++, if f is r-invariant and
P
(A;a) f(A;a) = n,
then I(f) =
P
(A;a) f(A;a)I(1(A;a) + zr
nr).
Proof of Lemma 3: Consider any r 2 R and n 2 Z++. Let f be r-invariant with
P
(A;a) f(A;a) = n. Then, for any observation (A;a) with f(A;a) > 0, the collections
of observations f  1(A;a) and 1(A;a) have both less than n observations. By Lemmas 1
and 2, the collections of observations f   1(A;a) + (n   1)zr
nr and 1(A;a) + zr
nr are both
r-invariant. Hence, (SEP) guarantees that I(f + nzr
nr) = I(f   1(A;a) + (n   1)zr
nr) +
I(1(A;a) + zr
nr). The repeated application of this argument leads to I(f + nzr
nr) =
P
(A;a) f(A;a)I(1(A;a) + zr
nr). Since f is r-invariant, the repeated use of Lemma 1
guarantees that I(f) = I(f +nzr





Now dene the following weighting function. Given any P 2 P, consider the ratio-
nalizable collection r 2 R such that P = P r and dene w(P;A;a) = 0 if a = m(P;A),
and w(P;A;a) = I(1(A;a) + zr
1r) otherwise.
Lemma 4. If f is r-invariant, then I(f) =
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P r;A;a):
Proof of Lemma 4: Consider a collection of observations f such that f is r-invariant
with
P




if a = m(P r;A), then I(1(A;a) + zr
nr) = 0 = w(P r;A;a). Otherwise, by denition of
zr
1, we know that 1(A;a) + zr
1r is r-invariant. Since by construction zr
1  zr
n, Lemma
1 guarantees that w(P r;A;a) = I(1(A;a) + zr
1r) = I(1(A;a) + zr
nr). Hence, I(f) =
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P r;A;a), as desired.
Lemma 5. For every f 2 F, P 2 P, I(f) 
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P;A;a).
Proof of Lemma 5: Consider any f 2 F and P 2 P. Let r0 such that P r0 = P.





(A;a) f(A;a)w(P;A;a): By (SEP) and




Lemmas 4 and 5 together imply that I is a minimal index.
Proof of Theorem 2: It is easy to see that any positive scalar transformation of
a Varian's index IV satises the axioms. To prove the converse, suppose that an
inconsistency index I satises all the axioms.30
By Theorem 1, we know that any inconsistency index satisfying (RAT), (INV),
(ATTR) and (SEP) is a minimal index. Let 	 denote the maximal value of I(1(A;a) +
zrx;a) across all observations (A;a) and collections rx;a with z such that 1(A;a) + zrx;a
is rx;a-invariant. Clearly, 	 is a well-dened positive real number. Dene the at-
tention mapping  by (A;0) = ; and for every e > 0 (A;e) = fx 2 A : 9a 2
A n fxg such that 1   I(1(A;a) + zrx;a)=	  eg for some a 2 A. Clearly,  is well-
dened. By (UC), this denition is independent of the chosen element a and the
specic rationalizable collection of observations rx;a.
We can construct the values w(P;A;a) by looking at I(1(A;a) + zr) where P r = P
and z large enough. If a = m(P;A), we know that w(P;A;a) = 0. Otherwise, by
(PI), w(P;A;a) = maxx2UA
P (a) I(1(A;a) + zrx;a): Given the above denition of , one
can directly rewrite w(P;A;a) = 	(1   supUA
P (a)\(A;e)=; e). By Proposition 1, this
construction is a positive scalar transformation of the Varian's index.
Proof of Theorem 3: It is easy to see that any positive scalar transformation of
the minimal swaps index satises the axioms. To prove the converse, suppose that an
inconsistency index satises the axioms. For any collection of observations f, we know
from Theorem 1 that I(f) = minP2P
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P;A;a): Consider any observa-
tion (A;a) with f(A;a) > 0, and the rationalizable collection r such that P r = P.
Recall from the proof of Theorem 1 that w(P;A;a) = I(1(A;a) + zr
1r). The repeated




1r). By (RAT) and Theorem 1, this is equivalent to w(P;A;a) =
P




We now prove that w(P;fx;ag;a) = w(P 0;fy;bg;b) whenever xPa and yP 0b. (ATTR)
and (UC) imply that w(P;fx;ag;a) = w(P rx;a;fx;ag;a), and that w(P 0;fy;bg;b) =
w(P ry;b;fy;bg;b). (NEU) implies that w(P rx;a;fx;ag;a) = w(P ry;b;fy;bg;b). Hence,
w(P;fx;ag;a) = w(P 0;fy;bg;b) and we can write w(P;A;a) =
P
x2A:xPra w(P;fx;ag;a) =
jfx 2 A : xP ragj, with  > 0. This clearly represents a positive scalar transforma-
tion of the minimal swaps index.
Proof of Theorem 4: It is easy to see that minimal loss indices satisfy the axioms,
to prove the converse statement assume that these hold. From Theorem 1, we are
left to prove that there exists a vector of real-valued weights u = (u1;:::;uk) with
u1 > u2 >  > uk such that for every P 2 P and every (A;a) with a 6= m(P;A),31
w(P;A;a) = ub m(P;A)   ub a(P). Let the rationalizable collection r be such that P r = P.
Let A1 = fx 2 A : xP rag and A2 = fm(P r;A);ag [ fx 2 A : aP rxg. By (COM),
(SEP), (RAT), Lemma 1 and the denition of zr
n we can conclude that I(1(A;a) +
3zr
2r) = I(1(A1;m(Pr;A)) + 1(A2;a) + 3zr
2r) = I(1(A1;m(Pr;A)) + zr
2r) + I(1(A2;a) + 2zr
2r) =
I(1(A2;a) + 2zr
2r). Now, if A2 is composed by only two elements we know from Lemma
1 that I(1(A2;a) + zr
2r) = I(1(A2;a) + (zr
2 + 1)r) =  = I(1(A2;a) + 2zr
2r). If A2 is
composed by three elements or more, consider the binary set A3 = fm(P r;A);ag and
the set A4 = fag [ fx 2 A : aP rxg. By (COM), (SEP) and (RAT) it follows that
I(1(A2;a) + 2zr
2r) = I(1(A3;a) + 1(A4;a) + 2zr
2r) = I(1(A3;a) + zr
2r) + I(1(A4;a) + zr
2r) =
I(1(A3;a) + zr
2r). Hence, in any case, w(P;A;a) = I(1(A;a) + 3zr
2r) = I(1(fm(Pr;A);ag;a) +
zr
2r) = w(P;fm(P r;A);ag;a).
We now prove that for any three alternatives b;c and d such that bPcPd, we have
w(P;fb;cg;c)+w(P;fc;dg;d) = w(P;fb;c;dg;d). To see this, consider a rationalizable
collection of observations r such that P r = P. Now, (COM) and (SEP) guarantee that
w(P;fb;c;dg;d) = I(1(fb;c;dg;d) + 2zr
2r) = I(1(fb;cg;c) + 1(fc;dg;d) + 2zr
2r) = I(1(fb;cg;c) +
zr
2r)+I(1(fc;dg;d)+zr
2r) = w(P;fb;cg;c)+w(P;fc;dg;d). Hence, we can dene weights
uP;x, such that xPy implies that uP;x > uP;y, and w(P;A;a) = uP;m(P;A)  uP;a. (NEU)
guarantees that these weights only depend on the position that the chosen alternative
a occupies in P, and hence w(P;A;a) = ub m(P;A)   ub a(P), as desired.
Proof of Theorem 5: Consider the collection of observations f dened by f(fx;yg;x) =
f(fy;zg;y) = m  1 and f(fx;y;zg;y) = f(fx;zg;z) = 1. According to the
Bernheim-Rangel-Green-Hojman preference P, zPx since x is never chosen in the pres-
ence of z. Now, note that for any preference P 0 such that zP 0x, it must be either yP 0x or
zP 0y and hence
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P 0;A;a)  mminfw(P 0;fx;yg;x);w(P 0;fy;zg;y)g.
For the preference P given by xPyPz we have
P
(A;a) f(A;a)w(P;A;a) = w(P;fx;y;zg;y)+




(A;a) f(A;a)w(P 0;A;a) and hence, the optimal preference of the minimal index must
place x above z, in contradiction with the Bernheim-Rangel-Green-Hojman preference.
Proof of Theorem 6: To see the rst part, consider the collection of observations f











(A;a) f(A;a)jfx 2 A :32
(x) < (a)gj, and hence solving the LOP provides the optimal preference for the min-
imal swaps index. To see the second part, consider the LOP given by weights c. Dene
the collection of observations f given by f(fx;yg;y) = cxy. Since f is dened over bi-
nary problems,
P




(x)<(y) cxy, as desired.
Proof of Theorem 7: Consider a balanced collection of observations f, and two
preference relations P and P 0. Clearly,
X
(A;a)
f(A;a)(ub m(P;A)   ub a(P)) 
X
(A;a)





























(A;a):b m(P;A)=t f(A;a)ut is independent of the chosen alternatives.
Since f is balanced, for each A such that b m(P;A) = t, there is one and only one A0
with the same cardinality than A such that b m(P 0;A0) = t. Since these two menus















f(A;a)(ub m(P;A)   ub a(P)) 
X
(A;a)









































The denition of a basic preference relation P guarantees that, for any s and any other








(A;a):b a(P0)=l f(A;a). Finally,
since us   us+1 > 0 for every s, the `if' claim follows. Clearly, when P 0 is non-basic,33
one of the former inequalities is strict, and hence the `only-if' claim follows.
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